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This case study addresses malware infection and the organizational and technical consequences.  This case study enables 
students to view the business continuity issues that should drive all security decisions in IT and allow analysis of the 
organizational and technical issues that impact recovery from a disaster that is caused by a malware infection.  Information 
systems students seldom see case studies that involve the issues of disaster planning and business continuity within the 
context of what has become an ever-more frequent occurrence: a virus/worm (malware) infection.   This case study would 
be appropriate for either undergraduate or graduate students in courses involving information resource management, MIS or 
information security. 
 






Disaster can happen at any time that threatens the 
continuity of business activities and does not have to be 
from a physical disaster, such as an earthquake or 
hurricane.  Increasingly, the availability and reliability of 
networks and infrastructure has been compromised by 
malware:  viruses, worms, and Trojans designed to impact 
network and employee productivity.  Malware represents 
the deliberate and malicious release of software that is 
designed to impact the productivity and profitability of 
individuals and corporations.  ICSA Labs reports that from 
every 1,000 computers, the infection rate will be 105.  A 
disaster is defined as simultaneous attack on 25 or more 
computers or an attack causing major damage.  The impact 
of downtime (defined as a significant loss of availability 
and reliability of networks, hardware or software) equates 
to lost revenue and increased expenses. As many sales, 
manufacturing, administrative, and production functions 
are automated and depend on networks for access, the 
unrecoverable loss of data can close a business, 
permanently.  Contingency Planning Research (2000) 
estimates the cost per one hour of downtime for various 
industries in Figure1 
(http://www.ontrack.co.uk/datarecovery/cost.asp). It is 
estimated that only 6 per cent of companies suffering from 
a catastrophic data loss survive the business disruption.  
The loss worldwide to malware is not trivial:  the  
Figure 1 
The Cost of Downtime 
Type of Industry Cost per Hour 
Retail Brokerage $6.45 million 
Credit card sales authorization $2.6 million 
Infomercial or 800-number 
promotions 
$199,500 
Catalog Sales centers $90,000 
Airline reservations $85,000 
ATM service $14,000 
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legendary Love Bug cost $9.63 billion, the leading virus in 
2002, Klez with $9.9 billion, Code Red cost $2.89 billion, 
and the most recent SQL Slammer is estimated to cost $1 
billion (MI2g). 
 
Less obvious in terms of loss is the productivity of 
employees that depend on computers for operations, 
customer support, plus loss of opportunities in missed sales 
and customer satisfaction.  A business continuity plan can 
prepare for the unexpected interruption of computer 
operations.  Ideally, this plan should include the 
eventuality of a malware infection that disrupts operations 
for a significant period of time. ICSA labs surveyed firms 
with more than 500 computers and found that the time to 
recover from each virus disaster in 2002 was 23 days.  
Seventy-five per cent of those surveyed had a significant 
virus outbreak and 62% had critical files corrupted by 
malicious programs.  A plan should outline the activities of 
the IT organization,  the recovery and work-arounds for all 
impacted business units in order to quickly resume 
operations.  With the cost of malware clean-up estimated 
by ICSA to be $81,000, the need for a plan to minimize 
losses is a critical component of over-all business strategy.   
 
Disaster by malware is most often found to have email as 
the locus of infection with 86% of all malware traced to 
email attachments.  The first line of defense against 
malware disasters has been anti-virus software that can 
detect viruses, worms, and Trojans in email attachments.  
Despite the presence of anti-virus software, companies 
continue to experience infections; in fact most of the last 
major infections occurred despite adequate anti-virus 
protection. Chris Belthoff, a senior security analyst at 
antivirus software maker Sophos, worries about the 
eventual impact: He thinks such worm attacks are turning 
e-mail into "such a polluted protocol that it's quickly 
becoming unusable from a business perspective." 
 
Virus writers have been prolific in exploiting the 
vulnerabilities in desktop and server operating systems 
creating malware that by passes anti-virus products. A 
virus writer summarized the issue of vulnerabilities, ” 
Some of these vulnerabilities have been known for years 
and the biggest of them has been known for centuries; 
Human Stupidity” (Delio). Virus writers use social 
engineering techniques to deliver their virus and ensure 
that the damaging payloads are delivered. Companies often 
do not include in their continuity plans a provision for 
adequate training of employees in understanding the social 
engineering that is used as a component by virus writers of 
their plan to deliver the virus to the company.   Malware 
has become more sophisticated, with the creation of 
blended threats: a threat that spreads like a worm as well as 
an email virus making it harder to control and to get rid of.   
 
 The following case describes a hypothetical incident.  In 
reading thiscase keep in mind that this company believed 
that they were adequately prepared against malware 
disaster because they had installed an anti-virus product on 
the desktops and servers.  Hundreds of computers were 
infected with a stealth virus not recognized by the latest 
antivirus software. The primary network at its U.S. 
headquarters had been shut down at 10 a.m., when the 
desktop support manager realized there was no other way 
to stop the virus from spreading. The virus, BadBoy, was 
on a rampage—copying itself to other systems and shutting 
machines down. 
 
2. CASE OVERVIEW 
 
Logan Industries, is a multi-national catalog sale 
corporation with offices in 30 states, 3 countries, and  has 
2,600 employees. The CEO is Andrew James, a man 
committed to technology and known throughout the 
company as a technology buff.  The company has a frame 
relay WAN (wide area network) connecting all offices, and 
each office has its own Windows 2000 server. The home 
office is located in California, where the IT department 
staff reside.  While most offices are small, with fewer than 
50 employees, the home office has the bulk of the 
operations and sales staff numbering 600 employees. The 
IT department is led by Ms. Pamela Lau, the CIO.  She has 
an IT manager, Jim Smythe, who directs the IT operations.  
The infrastructure consists of servers, high-speed fiber 
backbone, switching technology, desktops running 
Windows 2000 and an anti-virus product on all servers and 
desktops.   Jim Smythe is challenged to manage a network 
and desktops that are spread throughout the nation and 
relies on out-sourcing technical support in regional areas to 
service the computing needs of many staff. Additionally, 
he sends on a quarterly basis a team of his desktop and 
network support staff to the larger U.S. and international 
offices.  Ms. Janis Moto is the help desk manager and is 
the point of contact for employees that need support or 
service for their desktop. 
 
3. THE VIRUS ATTACKS 
 
3.1   First Infection: Monday, Feb. 5 
In 2003,   20 employees at a satellite sales office received 








I just had to send you this plug-in for our quarterly 
sales spreadsheet.  Our email server won’t let me 
email programs so I’ve renamed it.  Save it to disk, 
changing the .app at the end to .exe, then you can run 
it.  I don’t normally forward this kind of thing, but 




Attachment:  Plug_in.app 
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Shortly after receiving the email, employees followed the 
directions and downloaded the attached file renaming it to 
their C: drive and/or network share.  Twenty employees 
experienced a computer shut-down a short time later.  
Attempts at rebooting sent them into an endless reboot 
loop.   A desktop support technician, visiting the office on 
other business, looked at a couple of the misbehaving 
computers and identified symptoms typical of a virus. To 
stop it from spreading, she told the infected users to log off 
the network and wait for the help desk to contact them 
about fixing their machines. The support technician let the 
help desk know about the problem and figured that the 
help desk would tell employees to update their virus 
definition files.  
 
3.2 The Virus Spreads: Tuesday, Feb. 6  
Early in the morning, the infection had spread from dozens 
of computers to hundreds. The virus appeared to have 
mailed itself to everyone in the Outlook address book. 
Unknown to the IT staff, the virus scanned the email 
outbox looking for the last ten people emailed with 
attachments.  The virus parsed the message responding as 
if a follow-up with the phrase, “I sent you XYZ file but 
forgot to add this attachment”.  After sending itself, it 
would cause the machine to reboot and never to recover.   
 
The IT desktop staff examined one of the infected 
computers and found code in the registry identifying the 
virus as BadBoy.  The staff emailed instructions for 
everyone to look for BadBoy, the virus that was not yet 
recognized by the latest version of antivirus software. 
Anyone who found it was to call the help desk. At the help 
desk, the phone wouldn't stop ringing.  
 
By 10 a.m., the CIO had been called and decided to form a 
team to deal with the virus.  Two hours later, the team had 
decided on a leader and authorized a shut-down of the 
network to contain the virus. That meant no email for U.S. 
employees, no remote access for mobile users, no 
connection to offices in other countries, and no 
communication with stores, which could still ring sales and 
process credit card transactions but could not look up 
customer data or inventory at other locations.   
 
By noon, when the virus team realized how damaging the 
virus was, they told everyone at headquarters to turn off 
their computers. The only exceptions were 50 employees 
on a secondary network that hadn't been infected running 
critical programs on the AS400 mainframe, which 
controlled shipping and inventory.  
 
An IT desktop support member had found some of the 
virus's Visual Basic code with the header, "A clever virus 
by Dark Sam written in the year 2003." They emailed the 
code to the anti-virus vendor’s research lab.  This research 
team discovered that BadBoy was a network-aware worm 
that spreads through email to users in the Microsoft 
Outlook address book. When a user executes the infected 
file, the virus adds itself to the startup folders and places 
the plug-in.exe file in the start-up path. It attempted to 





C$\Documents and Settings\All Users\Start 
Menu\Programs\Startup\plug-ins.exe 
 
Team members were desperate to hear from the anti-virus 
vendor’s help desk.  The IT manager called the help desk 
and demanded to speak with a manager, who said the 
company needed to wait 24 hours for a response. 
 
The CIO called the local police who referred her to the 
FBI.  At first, the person who answered the phone at the 
FBI wasn't sure if the case fell under the bureau's domain, 
and asked the CIO to substantiate the dollar loss and 
amount of damage.  The CIO knew there was lost business, 
and possibly more than $5,000 damage. Stores were 
affected in more than one state. The FBI started building a 
case, in hopes of bringing the perpetrator to trial with 
enough damage to make a prosecution worthwhile.  They 
asked for samples of code to begin looking for clues as to 
the identity of the virus writer. 
 
3.3 Late Afternoon: Wednesday, February, 7th  
Wednesday afternoon, the AV developers sent a first 
attempt to find BadBoy on the disk drive and clean any 
infected files. The "fix" found the virus but destroyed some 
critical operating system files. Disheartened, the team 
came up with step two of what would be called the "temp 
fix": a way to clean the hard disk of the plug_in.exe. 
Technicians used a text search utility that works in DOS, 
to search for a text string that identified BadBoy. When 
they found the virus, they spent from five to 10 minutes 
manually removing the virus code from all file locations. 
The team of technicians visited each desktop, marking 
each one with a green sticker to indicate that the machine 
was “fixed”, and also began locating and cleaning infected 
files on the email and file servers at the home office.  
 
Users at Logan Industries had now been without access to 
a computer for three days and were getting frustrated.  The 
help desk was unable to broadcast when the virus infection 
would end and connectivity would be restored.  The sales 
manager seeing his quarterly bonus disappearing with the 
failure to close a couple of big sales locked himself in his 
office to use his laptop despite the warnings by the team 
not to use any computers on the infected network.  He 
subsequently infected his laptop and a server that had been 
“cleaned” of the virus. 
 
The AV vendor’s attempts to detect, clean and fix what the 
virus had done were getting better. By Friday afternoon, 
they sent a fix that both identified and removed the virus.  
IT team skipped the rest of the homegrown manual clean 
and began focusing on the remainder of the computers. 
Desktop support technicians spent the rest of Friday, all 
day Saturday and half of Sunday returning to all 600 PCs 
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in the home office. This time, they taped signs to all 
“cleaned” computers warning users not to power up until 
they got the OK.  No plan was yet in place to deal with the 
other offices at distant locations.  They decided to meet 
later that day to plan the how to repair the remaining 
hardware. 
 
4. THE NEXT WEEK: RECOVERY  
 
Monday morning at 10 a.m., the intercom in the home 
office finally blared good news: Employees could use their 
computers again. Stores could now communicate. 
European and U.S. locations could now communicate. 
(European locations, which were warned about the virus by 
fax, only had a few infections.). 
 
For IT, however, the war wasn't over. A dozen computers 
in the home office were so corrupted that the technicians 
needed to completely reinstall the operating systems and 
applications. There were details to take care of with the 
servers, remote office locations (with 1,500 infected 
desktops), and 500 mobile users who needed to overnight 
their laptops to headquarters for fixing.  The loss of some 
critical data files impacted the sales staff and efforts would 
begin to attempt recovery from back-up devices. 
 
5. THE CONSEQUENCES 
 
The CEO requested a report from the CIO.  The report 
included the following costs: 
 
Incident Costs    
    
Item Hours Cost/Hr           Total 
    
Incident 
Investigators 
(team) 150 $15.68 $2,352 
System 
Administrator 
(team) 200 $25.00 $5,000 
Consultant 200 $24.95 $20,000 
    
Staff 200 $15.00 $3,000 
    
Subtotal 750  $30,352 
    
Benefits @ 28%   $10,352 
    
Subtotal (Salary 
and Benefits)   $40,704 
 
Industry Avg. 
Downtime/Hour 200 $90,000 $18,000,000 
    
Cost    $18,040,704 
    
 
The CIO and CEO had no idea how to value the lost 
productivity for over 2,000 employees or to calculate the 
loss in sales when communication with customers and 
suppliers was cut for a week.  The FBI pursued the lead 
provided by the IT department and contacted DaRkSaM.  
He took full credit for "BadBoy" but defended himself, 
saying he only writes and publishes viruses on the Internet 
and couldn’t prevent others from downloading and 
releasing them into the wild.  He wrote in an email to the 
investigating FBI agent from the safety of his home in 
Europe that, "Better that you find out about a hole in your 
operation through my virus than through some unethical 
hacker smashing into your machines and stealing all your 
so-called private data." For DaRkSaM, it was an issue of 
free speech and performing a community service.  In his 
view it was not negligence but a charitable donation of 




The learning objectives for this case comprise the 
following: 
• The ability to describe the business impact of 
virus/worm infection 
• A comprehension of the responsibilities of an IT 
staff in delivering a secure environment 
• The steps to respond to and recover from a  
malware infection 
• Enumeration of the threats posed by a malware 
infection 
 
Downtime is not just an IT nuisance but a significant factor 
in the loss of sales, drop in stock prices and damage to 
reputation.  The impact of a network outage reaches to all 
devices that are attached to the network: email, web, file, 
database, print servers, as well as desktop and remote 
employees use of laptops.  Malware is a low risk and high 
payoff activity for an attacker.  Hackers are assisted in 
their efforts by the naiveté of most users and the absence of 
a comprehensive security plan that offers training to users 
in the recognition and response to malware received in the 
guise of harmless email.   
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